The 2017 Catalan independence referendum:A symposium by Cetra, Daniel et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2017 Catalan independence referendum
Citation for published version:
Cetra, D, Casanas-Adam, E & Tàrrega, M 2018, 'The 2017 Catalan independence referendum: A
symposium' Scottish Affairs , vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 126-143. DOI: 10.3366/scot.2018.0231
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/scot.2018.0231
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Scottish Affairs
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been accepted for publication by Edinburgh University Press in the journal Scottish Affairs, and
can be accessed at https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/scot.2018.0231. 
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
TITLE 
The 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum: A Symposium 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On 2 October 2017, ASEN Edinburgh organised the seminar Towards Independence? 
Understanding the Catalan Independence Referendum at the University of Edinburgh. The aim 
was to discuss the meaning and implications of the referendum from different disciplines. In 
this symposium, the participants offer an expanded and updated account of their 
contributions to the seminar. Daniel Cetrà argues that this was a disputed referendum 
reflecting a debate between legal and democratic legitimacy grounded on competing visions 
of nationhood. The referendum will be ‘remembered’ by Catalan nationalism as a major 
display of collective dignity against state repression, but whether it resulted in a mandate for 
independence is contentious.   
Elisenda Casanas-Adam examines the complex role of legality in the referendum. She argues 
that there are alternative interpretations of the Spanish constitutional framework available 
which would be more accommodating to the Catalan requests. She also suggests that the 
legality of many aspects of the Spanish authorities’ forceful response to the Catalan process 
is also not at all clear-cut.  From a media perspective, Mariola Tàrrega looks at the relationship 
between news media and political actors in the political dispute. She argues that the Catalan 
referendum shows a concerning context where news media become political advocators of 
opposed worldviews and politicians attribute news media an overstated capacity to shape 
nation-building projects. 
Daniel Cetrà 
On October 1st, the Catalan government held an independence referendum in which voters 
were asked the question ‘Do you want Catalonia to be an independent country in the form of 
a Republic?’. The Catalan Government estimated the final turnout to be 43% (2.3 million). 
Among those who voted, 90.2% voted Yes and 7.8% voted No.  
This was a disputed referendum. The position of the PP-led Spanish Government and most 
Spanish parties has always been that a Catalan independence referendum is unconstitutional. 
The referendum law was suspended by the Constitutional Court, and Spain’s attorney general 
ordered security forces to prevent any preparations for the vote. The Catalan government 
decided to go ahead and organize the referendum unilaterally after several requests to hold 
a negotiated referendum, a symbolic vote on independence in 2014 (Liñeira and Cetrà 2015), 
and a subsequent 2015 regional election which returned a pro-independence majority (Martí 
and Cetrà 2016). 
The dispute reflects a debate between legal and democratic legitimacy. In contrast with 
British unionism, the appeal to unionism in Spain has become a predominantly legal argument 
rather than an appeal to the economic and social benefits of the status quo. Since the mid-
1980s, predominant Spanish nationalist discourse recovered and shifted its focus to the 
vindication of the 1978 Constitution as the legitimate basis for maintaining the political unity 
of Spain. This shift gave a new, more democratic political content to what was presented as 
a previously existing nation (Núñez Seixas 2001, Bastida 2009).  
The debate between legal and democratic legitimacy is grounded on competing visions of 
nationhood. This is a tale of two nationalisms whose predominant forms hold 
incommensurable views as to whether Spain is mononational or plurinational. The view of a 
single Spanish sovereignty enshrined in the constitution is supported by all unionist parties 
except Podemos. Supporters of the referendum contend that Catalans are a nation entitled 
to ‘the right to decide’ –self-determination– and that this right should prevail over narrow 
interpretations of the Spanish constitution.  
While in 2014 the Spanish Government tolerated the symbolic vote on independence, this 
time their goal was to prevent the referendum. Spanish President Mariano Rajoy insisted that 
the referendum was illegal and was not going to take place. Before the vote, the strategy of 
the Spanish Government consisted of treating the referendum as a case of disobedience and 
letting security forces to prevent any activities preparing the vote following the orders of the 
Spanish judiciary. This included the arrest of high-ranking officials and the search of 
newspapers, printing companies and mail services to seize referendum material. 
The vote was not going to be the decisive event that the independence movement hoped for. 
The Catalan Government framed it as qualitatively different to the 2014 vote, a referendum 
whose results would be binding rather than another ‘participation process’ or act of protest. 
However, the turnout was similar to the 2014 symbolic vote (36 per cent), although it is worth 
noting that this time 16 and 17 year olds and immigrants with residence card could not vote. 
In addition, the result did not reflect actual public opinion. Some 45 per cent of Catalans 
support independence, although recent events may have had an effect on public opinion. 
Perhaps paradoxically, independence supporters needed unionists to get out and vote to give 
the referendum legitimacy, but once again a vote on independence not agreed with Madrid 
was hostage to a boycott by most Catalan unionists. 
It was the police violence on the day of the vote which turned what was going to be another 
failed attempt by the pro-independence movement to obtain a clear mandate for 
independence into a symbol of collective resistance against state repression. The Spanish 
Government sought to stop the vote through police intervention, with the Spanish police 
smashing their way into some polling locations and beating voters with batons. As a result, 
1,066 people were treated by the Catalan health services and 400 polling stations of a total 
of 2,315 were shut down.  
The Spanish Government’s strategy proved both repressive and ineffective, and the Catalan 
government gained significant political capital and control of the narrative. The use of 
violence deepened the constitutional crisis in Spain, damaged Spain’s international image, 
and fed into the increasingly prominent argument within the Catalan independence camp 
that secession is a remedial solution against Spain’s disrespect for democracy and basic rights 
(Serrano 2015).  
The level of popular organization to allow the vote to take place under the judiciary pressure 
and the episodes of violent episodes was noteworthy. It included citizens smuggling ballot 
boxes and occupying schools designated as polling stations throughout the weekend, 
preventing them from being sealed off by the police. On the day of the vote, voters formed 
human shields at polling stations from 5am until 8pm. Scholars interested in social 
movements have in Catalonia an attractive object of study, in light of the popular organization 
on October 1st and the six consecutive years of mass, pro-independence demonstrations on 
Catalonia’s national day.  
While we lack perspective to fully account for its relevance, the 1st of October 2017 is likely 
to be ‘remembered’ by Catalan nationalism both as a major display of collective dignity 
against state repression and as a major grievance towards Spain. However, it is contentious 
whether the vote resulted in a clear mandate for independence. This was an unconstitutional 
referendum in which the result was not representative of public opinion and the turnout was 
seven points lower than 50% –which was the threshold in cases like Montenegro– although 
it may have been higher in the absence of violence. The vote took place in very exceptional 
circumstances but the turnout seems flimsy grounds on which to claim a mandate for 
unilateral independence. 
The weeks following the referendum were characterized by continued political tension as well 
as political maneuvering and delaying. There was consensus within the constitutionalist block 
– PP, Socialist Party (PSOE), Citizens (C’s) – that the events in Catalonia are a legal matter to 
be addressed through the hard option of triggering article 155 of the Spanish constitution to 
impose direct rule on Catalonia. In a rare and strongly worded television address, King Felipe 
suggested that this measure was indeed adequate. The nuance is that the PSOE argued not 
to trigger article 155 if Catalan President Carles Puigdemont called early elections.  
On 10 October, Puigdemont confusingly said there is a mandate for independence and signed 
the declaration of independence but proposed to postpone its coming into force to seek a 
negotiated solution. He sought to find a balance that would satisfy everyone in the pro-
independence camp, divided on the issue of declaring independence unilaterally. His 
discourse was mostly addressed to the international community, seeking to show 
responsibility and emphasizing the need for dialogue and calls for mediation.  However, after 
Puigdemont was unable to seal a deal with the Spanish Government according to which he 
would call early elections in Catalonia and, in exchange, the Spanish Government would not 
impose direct rule on Catalonia, the Catalan Parliament declared independence on 27 
October.  
At the time of writing, this is an ongoing dispute and there is considerable confusion as to 
what may happen. The Spanish Government imposed direct rule on Catalonia and called an 
early election in Catalonia on the 21st of December. It remains to be seen the conditions under 
which pro-independence parties take part in the election and whether the results will be 
substantially different to those of 2015 to allow for a solution to the political deadlock.  
 
It is unlikely that the deep constitutional crisis in Spain be solved either by appeals to the 
constitution or by unilateral measures. The focus on the constitution is unhelpful because this 
is a political dispute, not a legal one: it is the very concept of a single Spanish nation and 
sovereignty enshrined in the constitution which is being contested. At the same time, the 
Catalan Government cannot implemented independence unilaterally. A constitutional reform 
in the mid-term cannot be ruled out, but given the present political majorities in Spain it is 
unlikely to result in a more accommodationist text with regard to home rule and self-
determination demands. EU mediation to promote dialogue between the two governments 
would be the most effective way to de-escalate the tension, but it is also the least likely 
scenario. As of today, it is unclear how the dispute could be appeased.  
Part of the problem is that the competing Catalan and Spanish national projects are 
simultaneously too strong and too weak. As Juan Linz famously argues (1973), the 
nationalization process in Spain in the nineteenth century was incomplete and allowed for 
the permanence of differentiated cultural characteristics which would later become the ‘stuff’ 
around which minority nationalist activists would build alternative national projects. Today, 
both nationalisms are strong. Spanish nationalism is codified in the constitution, embedded 
in state structures, and so predominant in most of Spain that it passes as invisible. Catalan 
nationalism is strong enough to articulate an alternative national project to that of the state 
and enjoys wide social support within Catalonia. Yet, both nationalisms are also weak. Spanish 
nationalism is unable to fully integrate Catalonia into the Spanish national project, and 
Catalan nationalism is unable to fully replace the state project with its own and secure a clear 
internal majority for independence.  
Elisenda Casanas-Adam 
 
The question of legality (or constitutionality) has been central to the debates surrounding, 
and the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum. This contribution will briefly reflect on the 
complex role of legality in the Catalan Independence Referendum 2017, focusing on three 
questions: 1. Does the Spanish Constitution of 1978 allow Catalonia to hold an independence 
referendum?  2.Did the 2017 Catalan independence referendum comply with international 
standards? 3. What are the questions of legality arising in relation to the Spanish authorities’ 
responses to the Catalan Referendum? 
 
1. Does the Spanish Constitution of 1978 allow Catalonia to hold an 
independence referendum?  
 
As is well known, the Spanish Government’s on-going opposition to the Catalan authorities 
holding an independence referendum is because it considers that this is not compatible with 
the Spanish constitutional and legal framework.  The main constitutional argument put 
forward by the Spanish authorities against the referendum is that there is no Catalan nation 
with a right to decide its own constitutional future (Casanas Adam, 2014). This is based on 
Arts. 1 and 2 of the Constitution, which provide that ‘National sovereignty belongs to the 
Spanish people’ and that ‘The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
Nation’.  According to the Spanish authorities, if it were to go ahead the referendum would 
require the consultation of the entire Spanish people, or it could not be held without a 
previous reform of the Constitution in this sense. However, as drafted the 1978 Constitution 
provides for a flexible and open framework where ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
nation’ has to be interpreted together with the provision for ‘the right to autonomy of 
nationalities (a compromise term used to refer to Spain’s historical minority nations, 
Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia) and regions’, included in the same Article (Art. 2 CE). 
These and other provisions regarding the State of the Autonomies were included to provide 
specific recognition for Spain’s minority nations and to enable them to attain a high level of 
self-government within the newly territoriality decentralised state, reflecting an agreement 
that resolved one of the most challenging issues in the design of the new Constitution.  This 
plurinational constitutional understanding of the State is the one that prevails in Catalonia 
and some other Autonomous Communities. From the perspective of the Catalan authorities, 
therefore, the insistence of the Spanish authorities in maintaining this very restrictive unitary 
constitutional interpretation has resulted in a clear breach of the 1978 agreement, and 
entitled them to proceed unilaterally with the referendum.   
 
The second set of constitutional arguments against Catalonia’s capacity to hold a referendum 
on independence are that the current constitutional framework does not grant it such 
competence (Casanas Adam, 2014). These arguments are based on the constitutional 
regulation of referendums and, in particular, on the exclusive competence of the central state 
over the ‘Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums’ (Art. 
149.1.32). In addition, there is also a general provision enabling the central Government to 
submit political decisions of special importance to a consultative referendum (Art.92). Various 
academics and experts from within and outside Catalonia have pointed to at least five 
different ways in which the referendum (or a consultation) could be held in a way compatible 
with the Constitutional framework. Depending on the option, these would require the 
acceptance, express authorisation of, or organisation of the process by, the Spanish 
authorities. Their refusal to even engage with any of these processes led to arguments that 
the Spanish authorities’ opposition to the referendum is for political rather than strictly legal 
reasons, and reinforced the Catalan authorities’ decision to proceed with the referendum 
unilaterally.  
 
As a result of the above, more recently arguments in favour of the possibility of Catalonia 
being able to hold a referendum within the current constitutional framework are based of the 
democratic principle contained in Art. 1 of the Constitution, which is one of the foundations 
of the system and informs the interpretation of the rest of the constitutional text. The strong 
citizen support for the referendum is clear both from the intensity of civil society movements 
and activities and the outcome of the recent 2012 and 2015 elections.   
 
2. Did the 2017 Catalan independence referendum comply with international 
standards? 
 
While held in open defiance of the constitutional and legal framework as interpreted by the 
Spanish authorities, a second set of legal questions arose in relation to the 2017 
independence referendum meeting the established international standards for such 
processes. To this end, various groups of international observers travelled to Catalonia to 
monitor the 2017 referendum process.  
 
In order to provide a clear legal framework for the referendum, on the 6th September 2017 
the Catalan Parliament adopted a ‘Referendum Act 2017’, which provided for a binding 
referendum on independence and established a Catalan Electoral Commission to supervise 
the process. The next day it proceeded to enact the ‘Act of legal transition and of the 
formation of the republic 2017’, to enter into force in the case of the victory of the ‘Yes’ vote, 
and to regulate Catalonia’s transition to independent statehood. However, the enactment of 
these Acts was strongly criticised because of significant irregularities in parliamentary 
procedure, including being passed in a single day with a single reading, with limited debate, 
and with a simple majority. As one of the reports from the international observers noted, this 
‘’deviated from a number of good practices’’ (ILOM, 2017). But in this case, as in the meeting 
of international and good practice standards for the holding of the referendum more 
generally, the Catalan authorities were placed in a difficult situation: In a context where any 
actions or measures were immediately challenged and, if possible, invalidated, they also had 
to try and ensure that the legislation, and then the referendum, could effectively proceed. 
Indeed, once enacted both Acts were immediately challenged by the Spanish authorities and 
suspended by the Constitutional Court. 
 
In the days leading up to the referendum, the Spanish authorities also used extensive and 
severe measures to prevent the referendum going ahead, and which had a notable impact on 
the planning and organisation of the vote (Jones, Burgen, Rankin, 2017). These encompassed, 
among others, search and seizure of materials, closure of websites, threats of legal 
consequences, arrests, and imposition of fines for those involved, the assumption of the 
control of Catalonia’s finances and of the coordination of the Catalan police force, and the 
deployment of thousands of extra police officers from other parts of the state. As is now well 
known, on the actual day of the vote these state police officers were then sent in to seize 
ballot boxes and close polling stations, resulting in the images of violence that were 
broadcasted across the world.      
 
In their initial reports on the monitoring of the process, the international observers all seem 
to reach similar conclusions, highlighting that ‘‘Because of the adverse circumstances under 
which the event took place, (…) the referendum, as held, could not comply with key 
international standards.’’ (ILOM, 2017). For example, ‘’In the face of external interference 
there were improvisations and last minute changes to the voting process that were not always 
consistent across Catalonia or with what was in the law or in the manual’’ (Catt, 2017). There 
were also problems of transparency highlighted, due to the need to keep many of the 
preparations secret (ILOM, 2017). However, they all also ultimately agreed that those 
involved had done all they could to comply with such standards, noting that: ‘‘as far as the 
organisation of polling stations is concerned, (…) the process was prepared thoroughly and in 
agreement with the existing legislation (..)’’ (IPD, 2017); ‘’those who worked in the polling 
stations did so in good faith, and we saw no sign of attempts to manipulate the vote’’ (Catt, 
2017); and that ‘‘polling staff performed to the best of their ability in trying to cope, and in 
trying to follow electoral procedures’’. (ILOM 2017). As summed up by one organisation, ‘The 
democratic process was threatened, but it was not destroyed’’ (IPD, 2017).  
 
In the end, however, because of the repressive measures adopted by the Spanish authorities, 
the referendum became more an act of resistance and an assertion of a desire to be heard 
than a referendum as planned. For example, it makes little sense to discuss the turnout (42%) 
when there were riot police in the street violently seizing ballot boxes and preventing people 
from voting. Because of this, the unilateral declaration of independence adopted by the 
Catalan Parliament that followed received very little international recognition. However, at 
the same time the fact that 2.2 million people came out to vote in these conditions (90 % in 
favour of independence) highlights the very high degree of citizen dissatisfaction with the 
Catalonia’s relationship with the rest of the state, which is notably significant and should not 
be ignored.  
 
3. What are the questions of legality arising in relation to the Spanish authorities’ 
responses to the Catalan Referendum? 
 
When the current conflict is considered from a constitutional and legal perspective, much of 
the focus is on the initiatives and measures adopted by the Catalan authorities in the 
referendum process and the developments that followed. However, a significant number of 
scholars and experts from inside and outside Catalonia have also highlighted that many of the 
actions of the Spanish authorities in the period leading up to the referendum, on the day of 
the vote, and in response to the developments that have followed may not be fully 
compatible with the Spanish constitutional and legal framework, including Spain’s 
international human rights obligations. Firstly, the Spanish authorities’ measures to try and 
forcefully stop the referendum from going ahead raised serious concerns regarding freedom 
of expression, assembly, association and due process (Jones, Burgen, Rankin, 2017). Secondly, 
the images of the Spanish police using extreme force against Catalan citizen peacefully trying 
to vote have received strong criticisms for being clearly disproportionate and in violation of 
Spain’s human rights obligations by various human rights organisations, among them, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International, 2017; Human Rights 
Watch, 2017). Thirdly, the more recent measures that have followed the referendum are also 
the object of some disagreement as to their legality. On the one hand, the charging of the 
two main civil society pro-independence leaders with sedition, and their immediate 
preventive imprisonment without bail is considered notably disproportionate by some legal 
experts (Nieva-Fenoll, 2017; Pasquau Liano, 2017). Similar charges are currently also being 
brought against the Catalan Prime Minister who played a leading role in the declaration of 
independence, the ministers of his government, and the pro-independence members of the 
Catalan Parliament’s Presiding Body. On the other hand, both the process and the extent of 
the measures adopted in the application of Art. 155 of the Spanish Constitution, which 
enables the Spanish authorities to intervene in the exercise of Catalan autonomy, have also 
been questioned as to their compatibility with the legal and constitutional framework and 
have already resulted in challenges before the Constitutional Court (Urias, 2017; Brunet, 
2017). All the above highlight that the legality challenges in the Catalan referendum process 
are not all one-sided.  
 
Concluding comments  
 
The main aim of this contribution is to highlight the complex role of legality in the 2017 
Catalan Independence Referendum. While many of the debates focus on the Catalan 
authorities’ apparent breach of the Spanish constitutional framework, a more detailed 
consideration highlights there are other competing interpretations of this framework that are 
more accommodating to the Catalan requests. At the same time, the legality of many aspects 
of the Spanish authorities’ forceful response to the Catalan process is also not at all clear-cut. 
The above is largely due to the fact that the escalation of the conflict has resulted in the 
adoption of extreme legal measures on both sides. Overall, this highlights that this is a political 
conflict that cannot be resolved by strictly legal means. It requires a newly negotiated political 
agreement between Catalonia and Spanish authorities, which ideally should by ratified in a 
referendum by Catalan citizens.  
 
Mariola Tàrrega 
 
In the run-up to the Catalan independence referendum and its outcomes, Spanish and Catalan 
news media played a magnified political role in the conflict. In a context of lack of dialogue 
channels between the two sides and the absence of a formal two-sided campaign, news 
media have become more than just the battlefield of ideas. News media have not only taken 
sides in the debate and actively campaigned for them following the cues of political parties 
very closely, but politicians have attributed to news media a magnified power of influence in 
the clash between the two nation-building projects. Politicians discrediting the veracity of 
news stories, the threat of legal actions from the State against some news media, and 
journalists being harassed in demonstrations from both sides of the debate are examples of 
the magnified political role of news media in the Catalan referendum debate. The following 
lines are an attempt to contextualize and explain this situation. 
 
Political parties and news media editorial lines 
 
It is fairly common that news media take sides in the context of a referendum (Vreese, 2007). 
They did so in the Scottish and Quebec independence referendums and there were also 
accusations of media bias against the two sides (Greig, 2016; Hazel, 2001). However, in the 
Catalan case the role of news media has gone beyond taking sides on the debate in a context 
where there was no formal No Vote campaign but a campaign against the referendum itself 
and a Yes Vote campaign. In this context, the media have not only taken sides in the debate 
but contributed to the generation of arguments in the political dispute.  
 
Political events have been reported from two diametrically opposed and even contradictory 
views reflecting the two worldviews of Spanish Unionist parties and Catalan pro-
independence actors. Anti-independence political actors were not officially campaigning but 
there was a pseudo-campaign against the referendum consisting of constant press releases, 
party events resembling campaign trials and social media campaigns to ‘unmask the lies of 
the independence movement’ (Partido Popular, 2017). The media played a central role in the 
articulation of the pseudo-campaign. For instance, while Catalan news media reported on the 
police violence against voters in polling stations, Spanish unionist news media published 
stories on how pro-independence news media promoted fake police violence images. This 
latter line has become one of the main arguments used by the Spanish Government and 
Spanish unionist actors against the pro-independence movement. This argument has been 
strongly criticised not only by pro-independence actors but also by international news media 
covering the Catalan dispute.  
 
One of the reasons behind news media playing a magnified political role is because political 
elites regard news media as means of ideological expression and mobilization by political 
elites (Gonzalez, Rodriguez, & Castromil, 2010)  and less a forth watchdog power. Catalonia 
and Spain’s media system respond to the model of Polarised Pluralist media systems (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004) and this is one of the key elements that explain the communication 
dynamics in the Catalan political dispute. The model of Polarised Pluralist media system, also 
associated to France, Italy and Greece, explains that in these contexts news media have been 
intimately involved in key political conflicts. For instance, during the Spanish democratic 
transition newspapers closely advocated for the new regime along with some of today’s key 
Spanish parties (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). The closeness between political parties 
and news media is also exemplified in the use of editorial pieces that have been traditionally 
directed towards influential elites, as was the case in November 2009 when twelve Catalan-
based newspapers published a common editorial piece to give their support to the new 
Catalan Statute of Autonomy and against the Spanish Constitutional Court’s ruling against it 
(Lopez & Barrero, 2012). The positioning and active role of news media also became evident 
during the 2014 non-binding consultation for Catalan independence. Research showed how 
55% of Spanish newspaper stories framed the consultation in negative terms, while 59% of 
Catalan news stories remained neutral and 26% positive (Ballesteros, 2015). The result of all 
the above described elements is a media context highly polarised and divided between most 
Spanish news media on the anti-independence side, and some but not all Catalan news media 
advocating the cause for a referendum and some also for the independence of Catalonia.   
Public broadcasting and nation-building projects 
 
The political role of news media has also been magnified by politicians attributing news media 
a stronger power of influence in the shaping of the Spanish and the Catalan nation-building 
projects, and the threat of legal actions against the Catalan broadcaster and against some 
Catalan news media. Spanish Unionist politicians accused the Catalan public broadcaster of 
not only promoting pro-Catalan government news but the institution itself is presented as 
one of the causes for the high pro-independence support in Catalonia. This happens in a 
context where traditionally the Spanish and the Catalan public broadcaster are under 
constant fire because of their respective pro-government bias (Fernández, Sarabia, Sánchez, 
& Bas, 2011). 
 
Spanish Unionist parties publicly attribute the Catalan broadcaster the power to ‘manipulate’ 
people’s perceptions and hence, the power to generate massive public consent around the 
idea of an independent Catalonia. At the same time, journalists at the Spanish Public 
Broadcaster organised a demonstration in the news room to protest against Spanish Unionist 
parties’ attempts to manipulate news stories on Catalonia. Bias accusations reached a 
moment of elevated tension when the Spanish government announced their intention of 
taking control of the Catalan public broadcaster to guarantee impartiality and truthful 
information as part of the measures to gain back control of Catalonia’s autonomy. This 
proposal needs to be placed in the historical conflict between Spain and Catalonia’s media 
policies (Bonet & Guimerà, 2016) and the more politicized system of public broadcasting 
governance found in Catalonia and Spain (Fernandez & Fernandez, 2012). 
 
Spanish government reactions against the Catalan public broadcaster and its willingness to 
control this institution relates to the role played by news media in Catalonia’s nation building 
project. Catalonia’s nation-building project has attributed news media a key role in promoting 
the use of Catalan language and the creation of a Catalan public sphere (Guimerà & 
Fernandez, 2014). Over the past 30 years a series of media policies have facilitated the 
emergence of the Catalan Public Broadcaster, the Catalan news Agency, a network of around 
1,200 local news media, and newspapers and digital platforms operating in the Catalan 
sphere. While media policies are a devolved power to all autonomous communities, these 
Catalan media policies have disrupted, for instance, some of the expansion plans of the 
Spanish public broadcaster in Catalonia (Guimerà, 2013). The Catalan public broadcaster is 
dependent and controlled by the Catalan parliament and it remained for many years, until 
the recent emergence of new online platforms, on the top of the most viewed and listened 
news outlets in Catalonia (Guimerà & Bonet, 2012).  
 
Spanish Government proposal to take control of the Catalan broadcaster partly responds to 
a context where political powers are involved in the governance of public broadcasters 
(Fernández et al., 2011) . The respective Spanish and Catalan parliaments elect the broadcast 
director by a 2/3 majority and parliamentary forces put forward their candidates to the 
organism that controls the quality and plurality of the broadcaster. In this system, the 
majority party in the parliament can have the effective control of the public broadcasting 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Public broadcasting institutions are seen as a piece of the political 
system not as autonomous institutions as it is the case of the BBC in the UK. 
 
The threat of legal actions against some private news media in Catalonia had a precedent in 
the run up to the referendum. Earlier in September, Spanish police visited or wrote to a 
number of Catalan news organisations which had aired the official referendum campaign 
advertisement to give them a letter from the Catalan Superior Court of Justice. The letter, 
which also went to all Catalan public institutions, did not forbid the adverts or declare them 
illegal, or even say explicitly that it was illegal to inform people about the referendum. Instead 
it warned of possible criminal consequences from helping to bring the referendum about, 
without specifying what types of actions could fall into that category. The problem with such 
loose warnings has been the censorship that has come about: the daily newspaper Ara 
decided not to publish any more campaign adverts, for example. The Network of Local 
Television (La Xarxa de Comunicació Local) told its journalists not to ask politicians questions 
about the referendum until the day after it had taken place. At the moment of writing these 
lines, editors of those news media that received the letter have been summoned to give 
evidence of their actions in court.  
 
 
 
The social legitimacy of news media and journalists at stake 
 
As part of the cause and also consequence of the above described communication dynamics, 
the social legitimacy of Catalan and Spanish news media seems at stake. The watchdog group 
Grup Barnils has registered more than 100 incidents including direct attacks to journalists and 
episodes that threatened the freedom of expression and freedom of press since the start of 
the referendum campaign (Grup Barnils, 2017). Some of those incidents included protesters 
insulting and threatening journalists during demonstrations or interrupting live connections 
with chants against news media outlets on both sides of the debate. Far-right extremists 
trying to break in the Catalan Public Radio Station and carrying slogans targeted directly to 
news presenters.  
 
In the context of a polarised pluralist media system, research shows that news media are  
commonly perceived as tools of political bargaining and there are higher levels of public 
distrust on journalists and news media (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). However, the 
above described incidents and violent responses against journalists indicate the public 
distrust on news media might have reached concerning levels. Of particular concern are also 
the consequences of an extremely polarised media landscape and politicians’ attitudes 
towards news media. It seems quite difficult to see the emergence of spaces for dialogue and 
mutual understanding in a context where news media are promoting opposed political 
worldviews of the same events. Politicians, particularly Spanish unionist political actors, 
questioning the veracity of news stories and attributing the Catalan public broadcaster a 
magnified power of influence over the pro-independence movement do not contribute to 
generate channels for dialogue.  
 
The communication dynamics of the Catalan dispute exemplify the role political played by 
news media in a political conflict where national projects are at dispute. The conflict has also 
made explicit how politicians make of news media an instrument and at the same time, how 
some news media are willing to assume that instrumental role to shape the debate. All 
resulting in a context of concerning public distrust on news media and fewer channels of 
communication to facilitate a way out of the dispute. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this symposium piece we have sought to examine the 2017 Catalan independence 
referendum from a political, constitutional, and media perspective. A complex picture 
emerges of a contested referendum embedded in an unresolved confrontation between the 
Spanish and Catalan national projects. The Spanish government has adopted an 
unaccommodating interpretation of the constitutional framework to address the Catalan 
demand, but there are others available and this is in any case a political dispute that cannot 
be resolved by strictly legal means. News media have played a very significant role in 
enhancing polarization and escalation by shaping the debate and taking sides following the 
cues of political parties. This all results in a political deadlock in which compromises seem 
unlikely. The 2017 Catalan referendum is a crucial event in an ongoing political dispute –game 
on rather than game over.  
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